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Abstract. A sender who wants to influence a decision maker has no incentive
to collect information if he has to reveal all evidence so obtained, because the
expected value of posterior belief is equal to the prior. If he can conceal his
evidence at a cost, he invests more in obtaining information when this cost
is lower, and this dampens the incentive to conceal evidence as the decision
maker would become skeptical upon hearing nothing. In equilibrium greater
freedom to conceal information may lead to greater information revelation.
A sender has less incentive to conceal evidence when there is another sender
who can obtain conditionally independent information, regardless of whether
the other sender has the same or the opposite bias.
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1. Introduction
A decision maker often has to rely on biased senders to provide information relevant to
the decision. For example, a judge gets information from the defendant and the plaintiff,
the Congress gets information from regulatory agencies that may be captured by interest
groups, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration gets information from clinical trials
conducted by experts who are hired by companies that develop the drugs. Following
Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Shin (1994), we model these situations
as a “persuasion game,” with the following features. First, the sender’s payoff does not
depend on the state, but only on the decision maker’s action. Second, the sender presents
hard evidence that cannot be falsified but can be withheld. Third, the decision maker is
passive in the sense that he only forms belief about the state and lacks the ability to offer
contingent payments.
It is a well-known result that skepticism on the part of the decision maker imposes
severe constraints on the extent of selective information disclosure by the sender in a
persuasion game (Milgrom 2008). But when the sender cannot selectively use information
to influence the decision making, his incentive to investigate to obtain information will
be diminished. Consider a biased sender who does not care about the state and only
wants to maximize the decision maker’s posterior belief. Before the sender obtains the
information, he does not know whether it will be favorable or unfavorable to him. A
fundamental property of Bayesian updating is that the expected value of the posterior
is equal to the prior. If the sender has to fully reveal the results of his investigation to
the decision maker, then he cannot expect to alter the decision maker’s belief on average.
As a result he would have no incentive to engage in costly investigation. Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) provide general conditions for the sender to benefit from persuasion
when information has to be fully revealed. In our paper the sender’s payoff is linear in the
decision maker’s belief, so the sender cannot benefit from persuasion—and hence from
investigation—unless he can manipulate his evidence. Therefore if the decision maker
cannot offer contingent payments, letting the sender to withhold evidence turns out to be
important to motivate him to gather evidence in the first place. This interaction between
disclosure and discovery is the subject of our paper.
We consider a model in which the sender invests in gathering information before he
tries to persuade the decision maker. Investment is costly, and the level of investment
is unobserved by the decision maker. Furthermore, even after paying the investment
cost, the sender may still obtain no information. Because the decision maker does not
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know whether the sender is hiding some evidence or simply possesses no information,
the sender can feign ignorance and pool with those who are genuinely uninformed. How-
ever hiding unfavorable evidence can have costly consequences. The possibility of being
found out (by auditors, whistleblowers, journalists, or by mere happenstance) and the
negative consequences that follow in terms of legal punishment or reputation loss create
a deterrence to concealment. Both the extent of information non-disclosure and the level
of investment in information are determined endogenously in this model.
If the level of investment in information is fixed, then the sender discloses unfavorable
information more often whenever the cost of hiding information is increased. When the
investment level is endogenous, however, a higher cost of hiding information reduces
the ability of the sender to influence the decision maker, and as a result dampens the
incentive to invest in obtaining information. This will cause the decision maker to believe
that the sender is not well informed. Because the decision maker will then attribute a
lack of evidence more to the sender’s ignorance than to his concealment of bad news,
the inference that the decision maker draws from no evidence is less skeptical than in the
case when the sender is believed to be well informed. This effect creates a larger benefit
from hiding unfavorable evidence, and we show that the feedback effect can outweigh
the direct effect to produce a larger probability of hiding information in equilibrium. In
this case, the decision maker is hurt by an increase in the hiding cost not only because the
sender is more ignorant, but also because he is more dishonest.
We also use this model to study the effect of competition in a persuasion game. Many
discussions on this topic (e.g., Milgrom 2008; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008; Kamenica and
Gentzkow 2012) implicitly assume that competing information providers have access to
the same information. In that setting what is hidden by one sender can be revealed by
a competing sender, and it is not difficult to show that competition benefits the decision
maker. We consider situations in which the signals received by competing senders are
conditionally independent. In this case the comparison between persuasion by a single
sender and persuasion by competing senders is more subtle. First, because an sender
does not know the information possessed by his competitor, the incentive to strategically
conceal information is affected. Second, because the decision maker’s action depends on
the messages sent by both senders, the influence that each sender can exert on the decision
is changed, which in turn alters the incentive to investigate to obtain information. Taking
into account these two effects, it is possible that a decision maker is better off with a single
sender than with two senders.1
1Shin (1998) show that having two biased senders in an adversarial setting is better than having one
single unbiased sender. His result is partly driven by the fact that, other things equal, having access to two
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Consider first the incentive to withhold information when one is faced with a compet-
ing sender. This decision depends on the sender’s expectation about what message his
competitor will send. If the sender had the same information set as the decision maker’s,
the expected action of the decision maker induced by concealing information does not
depend on the presence or absence of a competing sender. This follows from the law
of iterated expectations. However strategic pooling with the ignorant types creates a di-
vergence of information between the sender and the decision maker: the decision maker
assigns some probability that her sender is concealing bad news, while the sender who
is contemplating to hide information knows that the news is bad. Because the sender is
more pessimistic about the underlying state than the decision maker is, he also attaches a
greater probability that the competing sender will deliver bad news to the decision maker.
As a result the expected action of the decision maker induced by his hiding of information
is worse for the sender compared to the single sender case. Holding the level of informa-
tion investment fixed, the sender would be less likely to hide information when facing
competing senders.2
While introducing a competing sender makes the existing sender worse off if he has
bad news and hides it, it makes the existing sender better off if he has no news. The intu-
ition is the same as above. When receiving no evidence, the decision maker thinks that the
sender has received unfavorable evidence with some probability, but the sender himself
knows that he is truly ignorant, so he is more optimistic about the messages from the other
sender than is the decision maker. Therefore, adding another sender has the effect of both
lowering the payoff from receiving bad news and raising the payoff from getting no news
(the payoff from receiving good news is not changed). This dampens the sender’s incen-
tive to acquire information, and leads to more ignorant senders in equilibrium. To put it
simply, competition reduces the influence that each agent has on the decision maker’s ac-
tion, which lowers the senders’ incentive to manipulate their information. But precisely
because each has a smaller influence on the decision maker’s action, the senders also
have less incentive to collect information in the first place.3 As in the single-sender case,
a sender who is believed to be less informed has more to gain from hiding information
signals is better than having one. In his model, the level of informativeness of the senders are exogenous.
In our paper, the investigation level is endogenous. We show that having two biased senders can be worse
than having just one biased sender—and by implication it must be worse than having one unbiased sender.
2We note that this conclusion does not depend on the competing senders having opposite biases. In-
troducing a competing sender with the same direction of bias will also reduce a sender’s incentive to hide
information.
3It should be emphasized that the smaller influence of an individual sender when there are multiple
signals is not just a statistical property. We show that the smaller influence is a consequence of the strategic
hiding of information in a pooling equilibrium.
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than a more informed one. So the feedback effect from competition can overwhelm the
direct effect to result in more information manipulation in equilibrium, once endogenous
information acquisition is taken into account. In this case competition in the provision of
advice can turn out to be bad for the decision maker.
2. Related Literature
This paper is related to studies that model an information acquisition stage before in-
formation transmission. Austen-Smith (1994) and Argenziano, Squintani and Severinov
(2011) consider this issue in the context of cheap talk games. In a persuasion game, if the
the decision maker knows that the sender is informed, information will simply unravel
(Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981). This implies that there is no incentive for the sender to
invest in information. Therefore we assume that the decision maker knows neither the
level of the sender’s investment in information nor whether he becomes informed or not.
Che and Kartik (2009) studies information acquisition before a persuasion game, like we
do. They show that a greater difference in the prior beliefs of the sender and the receiver
causes the sender to acquire more information but discloses less of the information he
acquires. We argue that the relationship between information acquisition and informa-
tion disclosure may not be a trade-off with respect to certain parameters. In our setup,
when the cost of hiding information falls, it can happen that the sender invests more in
obtaining information and also hides less.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on multiple-sender information transmis-
sion game. Much of this literature focuses on the special case where two senders have
identical information (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Krishna and Morgan 2001; Battaglini
2002; Ambrus and Takahashi 2008; Chan and Suen 2009), and therefore any divergence in
their messages would imply at least one sender is not reporting truthfully. The equilib-
rium construction in such models is very sensitive to assumptions about off-equilibrium
beliefs. In our model, senders receive conditionally independent signals which do not
perfectly reveal the state. Because any combination of messages is on the equilibrium
path, our model is not sensitive to equilibrium refinement concepts.
Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2011) study how com-
peting senders with same biases or opposing biases affect information transmission. Both
papers assume that the competing senders have access to the same data. Bourjade and
Jullien (2011) show that introducing a competing sender reduces the incentive for the
existing sender to conceal information. In their model the decision maker takes binary
actions. When there is another sender, concealing information may not change the action
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of the decision maker, so the value of hiding becomes zero with some probability. In our
model, the decision maker takes a continuous decision, so concealing information always
has some impact. We use the differential beliefs of the decision maker and the sender
generated by a pooling equilibrium to show that competing senders has less incentive to
conceal information given any fixed level of investment in information gathering. This
effect is similar to that described in the multiple-sender, multiple-receiver model of Dami-
ano, Li and Suen (2008).
One recurrent theme of this paper is that a sender’s ability to hide information gives
him the incentive to investigate. This result applies to many other settings. For example,
Dahm, Gonzales and Porteiro (2009) show that forcing pharmaceutical companies to dis-
close the results of their clinical trials will deter them from conducting the trials in the first
place. Shavell (1994) looks at a setting where buyers and sellers can acquire information
about the value of the product before a transaction, and shows that a voluntary disclosure
rule spurs more information acquisition than does a mandatory disclosure rule.
This paper does not take the mechanism design approach to the problem of eliciting
information from senders. We assume that the decision maker does not make monetary
payments contingent on the action she takes or on the messages sent by the senders, and
she simply takes the optimal action based on her posterior belief. Wolinsky (2002) and
Gerardi, McLean and Postlewaite (2009) study the optimal mechanism to extract hard
information from senders with biases. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) takes an interme-
diate approach, where they allow the decision maker to use monetary payments that are
contingent on the decision, but not on the specific evidences that the senders present.
3. Collection and Concealment of Information in a Persuasion Game
3.1. Model setup
A decision maker, whom we refer to as “DM,” chooses an action a ∈ [0, 1]. Her loss
function is (a − ω)2, where the state ω ∈ {0, 1} is binary. The belief about the state is
characterized by the probability that ω = 1. The prior belief of DM is pi ∈ [0, 1]. For
simplicity we assume that pi = 1/2.4 Given that DM is an expected loss minimizer, her
optimal action is a = P, where P denotes her posterior belief that ω = 1.
DM has to rely on the sender to collect information about the state. The sender shares
the same prior belief pi as DM, but is biased in the sense that his preferences are different
4None of the results in this section depends on this assumption. Proposition 5 that compares the incen-
tive to conceal information in the single-sender case and in the two-sender case also holds for any pi.
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from DM’s. The sender’s utility from DM’s action is a, which means that the sender
prefers the action to be as high as possible. Given DM’s decision rule to choose a = P,
this also means that the sender wants to maximize DM’s belief that ω = 1.
The sender can potentially obtain hard evidence about the state by engaging in costly
investigation. Let the level of investigation be denoted by x ∈ [0, 1]. If he chooses in-
vestigation level x, he obtains some hard verifiable evidence with probability x, and re-
mains ignorant with probability 1− x. The verifiable evidence is either g or b. Denote
the outcome of the investigation stage by s ∈ {g, b, n}, where n denotes the outcome of
no evidence. The information production cost is given by C(x), which is assumed to be
increasing and strictly convex, with C(0) = 0, C′(0) = 0, C′′ > 0 and C′′′ ≥ 0.5 The
investigation level x is unobserved by DM.
Let γ denote the precision of the evidence generating process, that is,
Pr[s = g | ω = 1, s 6= n] = Pr[s = b | ω = 0, s 6= n] = γ.
We assume the evidence is informative but not definitive in that γ ∈ (1/2, 1). Since
the sender prefers DM’s belief to be high, the outcome g is “good” from the sender’s
perspective while the outcome b is “bad.” We assume that the precision γ is exogenously
given.6
The sender can send one of the three messages to the DM: M ∈ {G, B, N}. Send-
ing message G means showing the verifiable evidence g; sending the message B means
showing the verifiable evidence b; and sending the message N means showing nothing.
In order to show G or B, the sender has to have obtained evidence g or b from his signal.
Whatever the outcome of his signal, he can choose message N. If the sender’s investiga-
tion generates a verifiable evidence, but he chooses to send message N, then we say the
sender is hiding evidence. DM observes neither the level of investigation x nor the signal
s obtained by the sender. She uses Bayes’ rule to reach her posterior belief based on the
message M sent by the sender.
The sender’s payoff is a − C(x) if he does not hide information, and is a − C(x) −
θ if he hides information (i.e., if s 6= n and M = N). We assume that the expected
5The assumption that C′′′ ≥ 0 is needed only to show the uniqueness of equilibrium.
6A sender may also want to spend resources on improving his signal precision. This incentive is well
understood and straightforward. If an sender is optimistic about the state (pi > 1/2), then he wants to
increase the precision of the signal to increase the chance of obtaining favorable evidence. If he is pessimistic
about the state (pi < 1/2), then he wants to decrease the precision of the signal. In our model, since pi = 1/2,
even if we allow the sender to increase the signal precision at a cost, he would have no incentive to do so.
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hiding cost θ > 0 is exogenous. For example, θ can be interpreted as a utility cost of
dishonesty. Alternatively, one can think of situations in which acts of hiding information
has a probability of being found out, and the sender would suffer a reputation loss or
other penalties when exposed. We do not give an explicit model of hiding costs; Morris
(2001), Kartik (2009) and Bourjade and Jullien (2011) provide some examples. Our main
focus is how variations in θ affect equilibrium outcomes. Of course, if θ is too large,
the sender will always reveal any evidence he obtains, in which case he cannot expect
to influence DM’s action on average. We assume throughout this paper that θ is small
enough so there is an incentive to invest in information:
θ < γ− 1
2
. (1)
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows. The sender chooses his investi-
gation level x; the evidence s realizes; the sender sends message M to DM; DM chooses
her action a; and the payoffs are realized. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, though DM is essentially not a player here.
Here we develop some notation. Since DM does not observe the actual investigation
level x chosen by the sender, her posterior belief depends on the investigation level she
conjectures her sender to be choosing, which we denote by x˙. In equilibrium, consistency
of beliefs requires x = x˙. Similarly, suppose the sender hides bad evidence with prob-
ability t. DM’s posterior belief depends on the hiding probability that she conjectures
her sender to be choosing, which we denote by t˙. In equilibrium, consistency of beliefs
requires t = t˙.
We let PM (M = G, B, N) denote the DM’s posterior after receiving the message M. We
let Us (s = g, b, n) denote the sender’s expected utility (before paying the investigation
cost) upon receiving evidence s. That is, Us is the sender’s expectation about DM’s action
given his signal s.
3.2. Incentive to conceal evidence
Since the sender wants to increase the posterior of DM, there is no benefit from hiding
good evidence. Therefore when s = g, he sends message M = G. Given the good evi-
dence and the prior pi = 1/2, DM’s posterior belief is γ. The sender’s expected utility is
Ug = PG = γ.
Suppose the evidence is s = b. The sender can either present this evidence, in which
case DM’s posterior becomes PB = 1− γ, or hide the evidence, in which case DM’s pos-
7
terior would be PN. The value of PN depends on DM’s belief about the sender’s investi-
gation level x˙ and about the probability that the sender hides his evidence t˙. By Bayes’
rule,
PN(x˙, t˙) =
1
2(1− x˙ + x˙(1− γ)t˙)
1
2(1− x˙ + x˙(1− γ)t˙) + 12(1− x˙ + x˙γt˙)
=
1− x˙ + x˙(1− γ)t˙
2(1− x˙) + x˙t˙ . (2)
We have Ub = PB if he sends message M = B, or Ub = PN− θ if he sends message M = N.
Finally, if the evidence is s = n, we have Un = PN because the sender cannot manu-
facture fake evidence.
For x˙ ∈ (0, 1), define h(x˙, t˙) to be the benefit of hiding bad evidence:
h(x˙, t˙) ≡ PN(x˙, t˙)− PB.
It is straightforward to verify that h(x˙, t˙) is strictly decreasing in t˙ and strictly decreasing
in x˙. The more often the sender is believed to hide bad evidence, the less favorable is the
message N interpreted by DM. Hence h(x˙, t˙) is decreasing in t˙. The higher the chance
the sender is believed to have obtained evidence, the less favorable is the message N
interpreted by DM. Hence h(x˙, t˙) is decreasing in x˙.7
Lemma 1. Let x˜1(θ) be the value of x˙ that solves h(x˙, 1) = θ. Let τ(x˙, θ) be the value of t˙ that
solves h(x˙, t˙) = θ for x˙ > x˜1(θ). If there exists an equilibrium with investigation level x ∈ (0, 1)
and hiding probability t, then
t = t(x, θ) ≡
1 if x ∈ (0, x˜1(θ)],τ(x, θ) if x ∈ (x˜1(θ), 1).
The proof of Lemma 1 is in the Appendix. The function τ(x˙, θ) is given explicitly by:
τ(x˙, θ) =
(1− x˙)(2γ− 1− 2θ)
x˙θ
.
When x = x˙ ≤ x˜1(θ), for any belief t˙ the benefit of hiding evidence h(x˙, t˙) is higher than
the cost θ, so the sender must hide with probability one. When x ∈ (x˜1(θ), 1), the benefit
of hiding evidence is strictly greater than the cost if t˙ = 0, and the benefit of hiding evi-
dence is strictly less than the cost if t˙ = 1. Therefore, the only possibility is that the sender
7Note that h(x˙, t˙) ≤ γ− 1/2 for any x˙ and t˙. If assumption (1) does not hold, then the sender will not
hide evidence for any x˙ and consequently he will have no incentive to investigate.
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randomizes between hiding and not hiding evidence, with a probability t = t˙ of conceal-
ing evidence that satisfies h(x˙, t˙) = θ. We also note that the equilibrium probability of
concealing information t = t(x, θ) is decreasing in the equilibrium probability of obtain-
ing information x, with limx→1 t(x, θ) = 0. In other words, the higher is the probability
of obtaining evidence, the less likely it is that an sender would hide his evidence once it
is obtained; and if he obtains evidence almost for sure, he reveal it almost for sure.
3.3. Incentive to collect evidence
At the information gathering stage, the sender expects that if he successfully finds any ev-
idence the evidence is equally likely to be g or b (because his prior is pi = 1/2). Therefore,
the payoff from choosing investigation level x is
1
2
xUg +
1
2
xUb + (1− x)Un − C(x). (3)
Note that Ug, Ub and Un only depend on DM’s conjecture x˙ and t˙ but not the actual choice
of x. Therefore, the marginal benefit of increasing x given DM’s beliefs is
MB(x˙, t˙) =
1
2
Ug +
1
2
Ub −Un.
There are two types of equilibria to be considered: a “corner equilibrium” with x = 1,
and an “interior equilibrium” with x ∈ (0, 1). For x˙ ∈ (0, 1), define
f (x˙, θ) ≡ MB(x˙, t(x˙, θ)).
Essentially f (x˙, θ) is the marginal benefit from investigation to the sender given that DM
believes that the investigation level is x˙ and that she believes the sender will hide bad
information with probability t(x˙, θ) as implied by Lemma 1. Figure 1 plots f (x˙, θ) as a
function of x˙. The upward sloping section corresponds to the case x˙ ≤ x˜1(θ). In this case,
the sender is believed to hide bad evidence with probability one. So Un = PN(x˙, 1) =
(1− x˙γ)/(2− x˙) from equation (2), and Ub = PN(x˙, 1)− θ. The curve is upward sloping
because ∂MB(x˙, 1)/∂x˙ = −(1/2)(∂PN/∂x˙) > 0. The horizontal section of f (·, θ) corre-
sponds to the case x˙ > x˜(θ). In this case, the sender is indifferent between hiding and not
hiding. Therefore, Ub = PB = 1− γ and Un = PN(x˙, τ(x˙, θ)) = PB + θ, and as a result
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f(x⋅ , θ′)
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θ′ > θ
Figure 1. Marginal benefit of investigation as a function of DM’s belief
f (x˙, θ) does not depend on x˙ in this region. More explicitly, we have
f (x˙, θ) =
12
2γ−1
2−x˙ − 12θ if x˙ ≤ x˜1(θ),
γ− 12 − θ if x˙ > x˜1(θ).
Proposition 1. For any θ that satisfies assumption (1), there is a unique equilibrium with x∗ > 0.
(i) If C′(1) ≤ γ− 1/2− θ, then x∗ = 1 and t∗ = 0.
(ii) If C′(1) > γ − 1/2 − θ ≥ C′(x˜1(θ)), then x∗ ∈ [x˜1(θ), 1) and satisfies f (x∗, θ) =
C′(x∗), and t∗ = τ(x∗, θ) ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) If C′(x˜1(θ)) > γ− 1/2− θ, then x∗ < x˜1(θ) and satisfies f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗), and t∗ = 1.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 says that there is full information gathering and full informa-
tion revelation when the marginal cost of investigation is sufficiently low. Note that the
message N does not appear in such a full information equilibrium. The equilibrium is
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supported by the off-equilibrium belief:8
PN = lim
x˙→1
PN(x˙, t(x˙, θ)) = 1− γ+ θ.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 state that when the marginal cost of investigation
is high, the equilibrium level of investigation is given by the condition that the marginal
benefit of investigation is equal to marginal cost. In case (ii), the equilibrium x∗ exceeds
x˜1(θ), and if the sender receives bad evidence he randomizes between revealing it and
concealing it. In case (iii), the equilibrium x∗ is below x˜1(θ), and the sender always hides
bad evidence. For any fixed x˙, the sender’s objective function is concave in x. There-
fore the point at which marginal benefit equals marginal cost corresponds to the optimal
choice of x. Since x˙ = x in equilibrium, we have
f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗).
As shown in Figure 1, the marginal benefit f (x˙, θ) is upward sloping in the conjecture
x˙. Nevertheless Proposition 1 establishes that there exists a unique intersection between
marginal benefit and marginal cost, provided that the marginal cost curve is convex (i.e.,
C′′′ ≥ 0). Moreover, since f (0, θ) > C′(0) = 0, x = 0 is never an equilibrium. The sender
will always invest some effort into obtaining evidence.
One interesting implication of Proposition 1 is that information gathering and infor-
mation revelation move together as the cost of information gathering changes. As the
marginal cost of investigation C′ goes up, equilibrium investigation decreases from x∗ = 1
in case (i) to x∗ ∈ [x˜1(θ), 1) in case (ii) to x∗ ∈ (0, x˜1) in case (iii). A lower level of x∗ makes
the message N more believable in the sense that DM would tend to interpret it as the re-
sult of no evidence rather than bad evidence being concealed. This in turn raises the gain
from concealing bad evidence. As a result, the equilibrium probability of truthful reve-
lation decreases (t∗ increases from 0 in case (i) to τ(x∗, θ) ∈ [0, 1) in case (ii) to 1 in case
(iii)).
Our next result relates to the comparative statics with respect to the exogenous cost of
8In this paper, we restrict the off-equilibrium belief PN when x = 1 to be the limit limx˙→1 PN(x˙, t(x˙, θ)).
This can be justified in several ways. First, if there is a positive but arbitrarily small probability that an
sender’s B message does not reach the decision maker (i.e., B message is turned into N message with a
small probability exogenously), then the belief PN will be the limit as this probability of mistake goes to
zero. Second, one can construct a game where the sender’s choice of investigation level has to be in the
interval [0, 1 − e], perhaps because getting a sure probability of evidence is impossible for some reason.
Then as e goes to zero, the belief PN at x = 1− e will converge to the limit.
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concealing evidence, θ.
Proposition 2. An increase in the cost θ of concealing evidence reduces the equilibrium level of
investigation x∗. Furthermore, if the cost function of investigation C is quadratic, a higher cost
of concealing evidence raises the equilibrium probability t∗ that the sender conceals bad evidence,
and lowers the payoff to DM.
When investigation yields hard evidence, there are two cases: either the outcome is g
or it is b. If the evidence turns out to be g, the sender can show it to his advantage. If the
evidence turns out to be b, the sender can hide it by incurring a cost θ. If the cost of hiding
bad evidence is so high that the sender always shows both good and bad news, then the
event of obtaining an evidence (s 6= n) brings no benefit to the sender due to the linearity
of his payoff in DM’s posterior. When θ is not too high, the sender conceals evidence with
some probability. Because DM makes a negative inference from the message N, a higher
chance of obtaining evidence is beneficial to the sender. The higher is the hiding cost, the
lower is the probability of hiding given fixed x˙, and hence the better is the DM’s interpre-
tation of the message N. This decreases the marginal benefit from collecting information.
Figure 1 above shows that a higher θ shifts down the marginal benefit curve f (x˙, θ). Since
Proposition 1 shows that an interior equilibrium x∗ is characterized by f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗),
and since C′ is increasing, equilibrium x∗ must fall as θ increases.
Recall that by Lemma 1 the equilibrium probability of hiding evidence is given by
t∗ = t(x∗, θ). An increase in θ has a direct negative effect on t∗ because ∂t/∂θ ≤ 0. How-
ever since a higher θ lowers x∗, and since ∂t/∂x˙ ≤ 0, the indirect effect tends to raise t∗.
Intuitively, when DM believes that the sender does not have a high chance of obtaining
bad evidence, she does not interpret the message N so unfavorably, which increases the
sender’s incentive to report N when he observes b. Whether the direct effect or the indi-
rect effect is stronger depends on the cost function C. Proposition 1 establishes that the
indirect effect is stronger when the cost function is quadratic. In this case, a higher cost
of hiding evidence paradoxically causes the sender to hide evidence more often. Since
Proposition 1 also shows that a higher cost of evidence always lowers the equilibrium
level of investigation, the payoff to DM necessarily falls.
4. Competitive Persuasion
4.1. Persuasion model with two senders
In this section we study the persuasion model with two senders who can potentially ob-
serve conditionally independent signals. The decision maker’s payoff and information
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structure is the same as in section 3. She can receive advice from two senders, 1 and 2.
Sender 1 is also the same as the sender in section 3. He prefers DM to choose high actions.
Sender 2, on the other hand, prefers DM to choose low actions. In particular, his utility
from the decision a is 1− a. Throughout this section we maintain the assumption that
the two senders have “opposite biases,” in the sense that one sender wants to maximize
DM’s posterior while the other sender wants to minimize it. In section 6 we discuss the
case when the two senders have “same biases,” in the sense that they both want to move
DM’s posterior in the same direction.
If sender 2 pays a cost C(y) to collect information, he has a probability y of obtaining
hard information (s2 ∈ {g, b}) about the state, and a probability 1 − y of obtaining no
information (s2 = n). Conditional of receiving hard information, the signal precision
is given by γ. The signal s2 is independent of the signal of sender 1 (denoted by s1)
conditional on the state ω, and each sender does not observe the other sender’s signal.
Since sender 2 wants to minimize DM’s posterior belief about the state, evidence g is
bad news to him and he may want to conceal it. Let u denote the probability that sender
2 conceals information when he observes g. If sender 2 conceals information, he has to
pay an expected penalty θ. DM and sender 1 observes neither the investment level y nor
the hiding probability u chosen by sender 2. We let y˙ and u˙ represent their beliefs about
these respective quantities.
The timing of events is as follows. Senders 1 and 2 choose their respective investi-
gation levels x and y simultaneously. The evidence of each sender, if any, is observed
privately. Then each sender sends a message to DM simultaneously. DM chooses an ac-
tion based on her posterior belief, and the payoffs are realized. The equilibrium concept
is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. That is, each sender’s investment level and concealment
decision are optimal given the other sender’s choices and DM’s beliefs. Also, DM’s beliefs
are consistent with the senders’ choices.
4.2. Information concealment game
Let DM’s posterior after receiving a pair of messages M1, M2 ∈ {G, B, N} be denoted
by PM1 M2 . When sender 1 sends his message, he has some beliefs about what the other
sender’s message M2 is. Let PM1|s1 denote his expected payoff from sending message
M1 given his private information s1. Notice that, unlike in the single sender case, the
expected payoff from sending a particular message depends on the privately observed
evidence because it updates the sender about the probability that the other sender will
receive a certain evidence, and thus the message combination that DM will observe.
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Suppose sender 1 receives bad evidence b. If he reveals it (sends message B), his
expected payoff is
PB|b = ∑
M∈{G,B,N}
Pr[M2 = M | s1 = b]Pr[ω = 1 | M1 = B, M2 = M]
= ∑
M∈{G,B,N}
Pr[M2 = M | M1 = B]Pr[ω = 1 | M1 = B, M2 = M]
= Pr[ω = 1 | M1 = B],
where the last equality follows from the law of iterated expectations. Thus, we have
PB|b = 1− γ. If sender 1 receives bad evidence but hides it (sends message N), his ex-
pected payoff is
PN|b = [(1− γ)y˙γ(1− u˙) + γy˙(1− γ)(1− u˙)]PNG
+ [(1− γ)(y˙γu˙ + 1− y˙) + γ(y˙(1− γ)u˙ + 1− y˙)]PNN
+ [(1− γ)y˙(1− γ) + γy˙γ]PNB. (4)
Given evidence b, sender 1 attaches probability 1− γ to the state being ω = 1. In this
case, he expects that sender 2 would send message G with probability y˙γ(1− u˙). With
probability γ, the state is ω = 0, and he expects sender 2 would send message G with
probability y˙(1− γ)(1− u˙). This explains the coefficients associated with the term PNG.
Similarly, the coefficients associated with PNN and PNB are sender 1’s subjective probabil-
ities that sender 2 would send messages N and B, respectively. In equation (4),
PNG =
PNγ
PNγ+ (1− PN)(1− γ) , (5)
PNN =
PN(y˙γu˙ + 1− y˙)
PN(y˙γu˙ + 1− y˙) + (1− PN)(y˙(1− γ)u˙ + 1− y˙) , (6)
PNB =
PN(1− γ)
PN(1− γ) + (1− PN)γ , (7)
where PN is given by the equation (2) of the single-sender case. Note that PNG, PNN, and
PNB are all increasing in PN. Since PN is decreasing in t˙ and decreasing in x˙, PN|b must
also be decreasing in t˙ and decreasing in x˙.
For x˙ ∈ (0, 1), define h(x˙, y˙, t˙, u˙) to be the benefit to sender 1 of hiding bad evidence
given the beliefs of DM:
h(x˙, y˙, t˙, u˙) ≡ PN|b(x˙, y˙, t˙, u˙)− PB|b.
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Let tBR(u˙, x˙, y˙, θ) = 1 if h(x˙, y˙, 1, u˙)− θ > 0, and tBR(u˙, x˙, y˙, θ) = 0 if h(x˙, y˙, 0, u˙)− θ < 0.
If neither of these two conditions is true, let tBR(u˙, x˙, y˙, θ) be the value of t˙ that solves
h(x˙, y˙, t˙, u˙)− θ = 0. Similarly, let uBR(t˙, x˙, y˙, θ) be the value of u˙ such that sender 2 is in-
different between hiding good evidence and revealing it (with uBR(t˙, x˙, y˙, θ) = 1 if sender
2 strictly prefers hiding good evidence, and uBR(t˙, x˙, y˙, θ) = 0 if he strictly prefers reveal-
ing it).
Lemma 2. If there is an equilibrium with investigation levels x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1), then
the equilibrium probabilities of concealing evidence are given by t and u, where t = tBR(u, x, y, θ)
and u = uBR(t, x, y, θ).
Lemma 2 states that the equilibrium probabilities of hiding unfavorable information
are the fixed point of the best-response functions tBR and uBR, which is a standard Nash
equilibrium requirement. In what follows, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which
x = y and t = u. We use t(x˙, θ) to denote the symmetric equilibrium value of t (and u)
when the investigation levels are x = y = x˙.
Lemma 3. Define x˜1(θ) to be the value of x˙ such that h(x˙, x˙, 1, 1) = θ. Define x˜0(θ) to be the
value of x˙ such that h(x˙, x˙, 0, 0) = θ. Let τ(x˙, θ) be the value of t˙ such that h(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙) = θ
for x˙ ∈ (x˜1(θ), min{x˜0(θ), 1}). If there exists a symmetric equilibrium with investigation levels
x = y ∈ (0, 1) and hiding probability t = u, then
t = t(x, θ) ≡

1 if x ∈ (0, x˜1(θ)],
τ(x, θ) if x ∈ (x˜1(θ), min{x˜0(θ), 1}),
0 if x ∈ [x˜0(θ), 1).
Moreover t(x, θ) is continuous and decreasing in x with limx→1 t(x, θ) = 0.
In the Appendix, we show that h(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙) is strictly decreasing in x˙ and strictly de-
creasing in t˙. It then follows that x˜0(θ) > x˜1(θ) and that τ(x˙, θ) is strictly decreasing
in x˙ and strictly decreasing in θ. One way to understand this result is to consider the
best-response function tBR(u˙, x˙, y˙, θ). It can be shown that tBR is increasing in u˙ (i.e., in-
formation concealment by the two senders are strategic complements) and decreasing in
x˙ and y˙. Similarly, uBR(t˙, x˙, y˙, θ) is increasing in t˙ and decreasing in x˙ and y˙. In a symmet-
ric equilibrium, we have x˙ = y˙; and when both are raised by the same amount, monotone
comparative statics of a supermodular game implies that the equilibrium t˙ and u˙ must
fall.
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4.3. Equilibrium investigation under competitive persuasion
Let Us1(x˙, y˙, t˙, z˙) denote the expected payoff of sender 1 given an evidence s1. For no-
tational convenience we omit the arguments when there is no ambiguity. The payoff to
sender 1 from choosing investigation level x is given by the same equation (3) as in the
one-sender case. The marginal benefit of increasing the investment in evidence collection
is:
MB(x˙, y˙, t˙, z˙) =
1
2
Ug +
1
2
Ub −Un.
In a symmetric equilibrium x˙ = y˙, and by Lemma 3, t˙ = u˙ = t(x˙, θ). We let
f (x˙, θ) ≡ MB(x˙, x˙, t(x˙, θ), t(x˙, θ)).
Since sender 1 never hides good evidence, Ug = PG|g. As in the derivation of PB|b, we
can use the law of iterated expectations to show that
Ug = PG|g = γ.
To calculate Un, we use
Un(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙) = PN|n(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙) =
1
2
x˙PNB +
1
2
x˙(1− t˙)PNG +
(
1
2
x˙t˙ + 1− x˙
)
PNN,
where PNG and PNB are given by equations (5) and (7) respectively with y˙ = x˙ and u˙ = t˙,
and PNN = 1/2 by symmetry. Finally to calculate Ub, we use Ub = PB|b = 1 − γ if
t(x˙, θ) < 1, or Ub = PN|b − θ if t(x˙, θ) = 1, where PN|b is given by equation (4) with y˙ = x˙
and u˙ = t˙.
Figure 2 shows the plot of f (x˙, θ) against x˙ for two different values of θ. Consider
the lower graph, for example. The upward sloping segment corresponds to the case
x˙ ≤ x˜1(θ′), when sender 1 hides bad evidence for sure. The downward sloping seg-
ment corresponds to the case x˙ ∈ (x˜0(θ′), x˜1(θ′)), when sender 1 randomizes between
concealing and revealing bad evidence. Finally the horizontal segment corresponds to
the case x˙ ≥ x˜1(θ′), when sender 1 reveals bad evidence for sure. Note that in this case
Ug = γ, Ub = 1− γ and Un = 1/2, so that f (x˙, 0) = 0. There is no benefit from increasing
the investment in investigation if the sender never hides bad evidence.
Let f (θ) ≡ f (x˜0(θ), θ) and let f (θ) ≡ limx˙→1(x˙, θ). From Figure 2, we see that f (θ) is
the maximum value of f (x˙, θ). We also note that f (θ) > 0 if and only if x˜0(θ) > 1. The
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Figure 2. Marginal benefit of investigation in a symmetric equilibrium
following result summarizes the symmetric equilibrium of our model.
Proposition 3. For any θ that satisfies assumption (1), there exists a symmetric equilibrium with
a unique x∗ = y∗ > 0.
(i) If C′(1) ≤ f (θ), then x∗ = 1 and t∗ = 0.
(ii) If C′(1) > f (θ) and C′(x˜0(θ)) < f (θ), then x∗ ∈ (x˜0(θ), 1) and satisfies f (x∗, θ) =
C′(x∗), and t∗ = τ(x∗, θ) ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) If C′(x˜0(θ)) ≥ f (θ), then x∗ < x˜0(θ) and satisfies f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗), and t∗ = 1.
Proposition 3 is the counterpart to Proposition 1 in the single-sender case. When
the marginal cost of information collection is sufficiently low, the equilibrium is a full-
information equilibrium with x∗ = 1 and t∗ = 0. For such an equilibrium to be possible,
we must have f (θ) > 0, which requires x˜0(θ) > 1. Since x˜0(θ) is defined by the value of
x˙ that solves h(x˙, x˙, 0, 0) = θ, we can solve this equation to get
x˜0(θ) =
2γ− 1− 2θ
(2γ− 1)3 .
Notice that x˜0(θ) is decreasing in θ, which means that the full-information equilibrium
(x = 1 and t = 0) is possible when θ is sufficiently low and C′ is also sufficiently low. Such
an equilibrium is supported by off-equilibrium beliefs PNG, PNN and PNG that makes Un
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small. Indeed, when the punishment to hiding information is low, sender 1 tends to lie
more often. Therefore, a low value of θ is consistent with a low value of limx˙→1 PN|n,
which provides the incentive for the sender to acquire full information.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 say that in a symmetric “interior equilibrium,” the
level of investigation is given by the condition that f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗). Although f (x, θ) is
not monotone in x, Proposition 3 establishes that an interior equilibrium is always unique.
In Figure 2, we see that a higher value of θ shifts down the marginal benefit of in-
vestigation f (x, θ). This turns out to be generally true. Since the equilibrium level of
investigation is given by the comparison between marginal benefit and marginal cost, we
have the following result.
Proposition 4. An increase in the punishment θ of concealing evidence reduces the level of in-
vestigation x∗ in a symmetric equilibrium.
As in the case of the model with a single sender, increasing the punishment to conceal-
ing information has two opposing effects on the equilibrium probability t∗ of concealing
information. The direct effect is negative because t(x∗, θ) is decreasing in θ, holding x∗
constant. But since a larger θ lowers x∗, and since a lower x∗ induces more concealment
(by making the message N more favorable to the senders), the indirect effect is positive.
We cannot make a general statement to determine which of these two effects dominates.
5. Do Two Senders Provide More Information than a Single Sender?
In this section, we compare the the two-sender competitive persuasion model and the
single-sender persuasion model. We use superscript T to denote the case of two senders
and superscript S to denote the case of a single sender.
The benefit from hiding bad evidence in the single-sender model is hS(x˙, t˙) = PN − PB,
while the benefit from hiding bad evidence in the two-sender model is hT(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙) =
PN|b − PB|b. We have already shown that the law of iterated expectations implies that
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PB = PB|b. To compare PN with PN|b, we can write:
PN|b = ∑
M∈{G,B,N}
Pr[M2 = M | s1 = b]PNM
= ∑
M∈{G,B,N}
Pr[M2 = M | M1 = N]PNM
+ ∑
M∈{G,B,N}
(Pr[M2 = M | s1 = b]− Pr[M2 = M | M1 = N])PNM
= PN + (E[PNM2 | s1 = b]−E[PNM2 | M1 = N]), (8)
where the expectations are taken over possible realizations of of sender 2’s message M2.
The distribution of M2 conditional on s1 = b is stochastically lower than the distribution
of M2 conditional on M1 = N in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Specifi-
cally, the probability that M2 = G is lower (and the probability that M2 = B is higher)
conditional on s1 = b than it is conditional on M1 = N. As a result, the last bracketed
term of (8) is negative, and we have PN|b < PN. Therefore,
hT(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙) < hS(x˙, t˙). (9)
Intuitively, when sender 1 receives evidence b and sends message N, he is pooling
with the type that receives no evidence. Such pooling introduces a divergence in the
information sets of sender 1 and of DM. Because sender 1 knows that the evidence is bad
(s1 = b), while DM believes that either the evidence is bad or there is no evidence (M1 =
N), sender 1 is systematically more pessimistic about the state than DM does. Furthermore,
because sender 2 tends to send lower messages (M2 = B or M2 = N) whenever the state
is low (ω = 0), pooling by sender 1 implies that sender 1 is systematically more pessimistic
about the content of sender 2’s message (i.e., he attaches a higher probability to the events
{M2 = B} and {M2 = B or N}) than DM does. In other words, sender 1 expects that his
message N would be accompanied by a relatively unfavorable message from the other
sender in the two-sender model, while no such effect exists in the single-sender model.
This explains why PN|b < PN. In contrast, when sender 1 receives evidence b and sends
message B, there is no divergence in the information sets of sender 1 and DM. In this
case, sender 1 has the same beliefs about sender 2’s message as DM’s. This explains why
PB|b = PB.
Since each sender compares the benefit from hiding evidence to the punishment θ,
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equation (9) immediately implies that
tT(x˙, θ) ≤ tS(x˙, θ). (10)
In other words, holding the level of investigation the same, an sender is less likely to hide
unfavorable evidence in the two-sender model than in the single-sender model. Loosely
speaking, this effect arises because the marginal impact of each sender on DM’s belief by
sending message N instead of message B is smaller in the two-sender case than in the
single-sender case. The smaller marginal influence of each sender, however, should not
be viewed as simply a statistical property of inference with multiple signals.9 Rather, the
smaller marginal influence is the result of disparate information sets induced by pooling,
as explained in the derivation of equation (8).
The result tT(x˙, θ) ≤ tS(x˙, θ) would suggest that DM benefits from having multiple
senders if the collection of evidence is exogenous: not only that having two signals is bet-
ter than having one, but each signal has a smaller chance of being strategically concealed.
However this conclusion has to be modified when endogenous information collection is
taken into account. With multiple senders, each sender is less likely to conceal unfavor-
able evidence because he has a smaller marginal influence on DM’s belief. But precisely
because his marginal influence is smaller, the incentive to collect evidence in the first place
is also diminished. We have the following result.
Proposition 5. The level of investigation per sender is lower in the symmetric equilibrium of the
two-sender model than in the equilibrium of the single-sender model.
The key to understanding this result is that the marginal benefit from evidence gath-
ering is smaller in the two-sender case than in the single-sender case:
f T(x˙, θ) < f S(x˙, θ).
For example, suppose x˙ is such that sender 1 would randomize between concealing bad
evidence and revealing it. Then the marginal benefit from gathering evidence is f T(x˙, θ) =
1/2− PN|n in the two-sender case, and is f S(x˙, θ) = 1/2− PN in the single-sender case.
But the same intuition that makes PN|b < PN also explains why PN|n > PN. Specifically,
we can write:
PN|n = PN + (E[PNM2 | s1 = n]−E[PNM2 | M1 = N]).
9It is not always the case that the marginal influence of one message decreases in the presence of another
message. For example, suppose M2 = G. It is easy to verify that PNG − PBG > PN − PB.
20
0.00 0.25 0.50
0.0
0.5
1.0
xS
xT
(a) investigation level
α
0.00 0.25 0.50
0.0
0.5
1.0
tS
tT
(b) concealment probability
α
0.00 0.25 0.50
0.00
0.12
0.24
LT
LS
(c) expected loss
α
Figure 3. Comparison between the two-sender model (T) and the single-sender model (S) for different
marginal cost parameters
The term in parentheses is positive because the belief about the state (and hence the belief
about sender 2’s message) is more optimistic given s1 = n than it is given M1 = N. Since
sender 1 expects that the signal s1 = n would be accompanied by a relatively favorable
message M2, his expected payoff Un is higher in the two-sender case than in the single-
sender case, thus diminishing his incentive to obtain evidence.
Because xT > xS by Proposition 5, the equilibrium probability of hiding evidence
tT in the two-sender model may be greater than or smaller than tS in the single-sender
model, depending on whether the direct effect (equation (10)) fixing the same investiga-
tion level is dominated by the indirect effect that works through the difference in the equi-
librium investigation levels. In Figure 3, we assume that the cost function is quadratic,
C(x) = αx2/2, and plot the equilibrium investigation levels and concealment probabili-
ties against the marginal cost parameter α (we set θ = 0.1 and γ = 0.9). Consistent with
Proposition 5, panel (a) shows that xT ≤ xS for all values of α. In panel (b), we see that
tT(xT, θ) ≥ tS(xS, θ). In other words, the indirect effect due to lower investment in evi-
dence collection causes each sender to hide unfavorable evidence with a greater probabil-
ity in the competitive persuasion case than in the single-sender case. We note, however,
that such this conclusion is not general. If the marginal cost function is highly convex
(i.e., it is near vertical when it intersects both f T(x˙, θ) and f S(x˙, θ)), then the difference
between xT and xS would be very small, in which case we can have tT(xT, θ) < tS(xS, θ).
Panel (c) of Figure 3 shows that even when xS > xT and tS < tT, DM does not neces-
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sarily always prefer to have one sender than to have two senders. When the marginal cost
curve is very flat (α < f (θ)), there is full incentive to collect and to reveal information in
either model. Expected loss for DM is smaller in the two-sender case for the simple rea-
son that two signals is better than one signal. When the marginal cost is very steep (α is
high), the marginal cost curve C′(x) cuts the marginal benefit curves f T(x, θ) and f S(x, θ)
at nearly the same level of x. In Figure 3, we see that xS is only slightly higher than xT
for large α, and tS = tT = 1. The slightly larger equilibrium level of investigation in the
single-sender case is not sufficient to offset the advantage brought by having two signals
in the two-sender case. Again DM prefers to have access to two senders. However, for
intermediate values of α, DM’s expected loss is higher when there are two competing
senders, because each sender invests less in evidence gathering and conceals more often
when unfavorable evidence is obtained.
In Figure 4 we compare the two-sender model with the single-sender model for dif-
ferent punishment cost of hiding evidence. In this example, we vary the level of θ while
fixing α = 0.25 and γ = 0.9. Panels (a) and (b) shows that there is more information col-
lection and less information concealment in the single-sender case. Panel (c) shows that
DM benefits from having one sender instead of two if either θ is very small or θ is very
large. In the former case, tT = 1 while tS = 0, so having two signals is not better than
having just one because the two senders always hides an unfavorable evidence. When θ
is large, the difference between xT and xS is minor, and again having two signals is better
than having just one. For intermediate values of θ, however, DM is better off with just a
single sender.
Although the comparison of the expected loss for DM under the two models is gener-
ally ambiguous, we can establish a sufficient condition for the expected loss to be lower
under the single-sender case.
Proposition 6. If C′(1) < 1/2− θ, then for γ sufficiently large, DM’s equilibrium payoff with
two senders is lower than her equilibrium payoff with a single sender.
Given the restriction on C′(1), when γ is sufficiently large, we have C′(1) < γ− 1/2−
θ. By Proposition 1, we have xS = 1 and tS = 0 in the single-sender model. In contrast, in
the two-sender model, for γ large enough, f (θ) = 0, so we must have xT < 1 and tT > 0.
When the signal precision is very high, a single-sender who always obtains evidence and
reveals it fully almost induces the first-best: the value of having another signal from a
second sender is very small to DM. Therefore, the benefit from a higher x∗ and a lower t∗
under the single-sender case dominates the benefit from having a second signal.
22
0.0 0.2 0.4
0.0
0.5
1.0
xS
xT
(a) investigation level
θ
0.0 0.2 0.4
0.0
0.5
1.0
tS
tT
(b) concealment probability
θ
0.0 0.2 0.4
0.00
0.13
0.26
LS
LT
(c) expected loss
θ
Figure 4. Comparison between the two-sender model (T) and the single-sender model (S) for different
penalties of hiding evidence
6. Same Bias versus Opposite Biases
So far, we have assumed that the two senders in the competitive persuasion model have
diametrically opposing preferences: sender 1 prefers to maximize DM’s posterior, and
sender 2 prefers to minimize it. While the idea that the “competition of ideas” is con-
ducive to information revelation has a long intellectual history (Smith 1981; Coase 1974),
and the role of adversarial interests is emphasized in the recent literature (Dewatripont
and Tirole 1999; Krishna and Morgan 2001), our model of competitive persuasion does
not rely on the assumption that information providers has opposing interests in influenc-
ing the decision maker’s beliefs. In this section, we provide a brief outline of the model
when sender 2 has identical preferences as sender 1, but their signals (if any) are private
and conditionally independent and they are not acting in concert.
Specifically, let sender 2’s utility from DM’s action be a, so that he also wants to max-
imize DM’s belief. Suppose sender 2 chooses investigation level y. If he obtains good
evidence, he reveals it; if he obtains bad evidence, he hides it with probability u. Given
the beliefs y˙ and u˙ about sender 2’s strategy, the benefit from hiding bad evidence to
sender 1 is hTS(x˙, y˙, t˙, u˙) = PN|b − PB (the superscript TS stands for “two senders, same
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bias”), where
PN|b = [(1− γ)y˙γ+ γy˙(1− γ)]PNG
+ [(1− γ)(y˙(1− γ)u˙ + 1− y˙) + γ(y˙γu˙ + 1− y˙)]PNN
+ [(1− γ)y˙(1− γ)(1− u˙) + γy˙γ(1− u˙)]PNB,
where PNG and PNB are given by equations (5) and (7) as before but PNN is not given by
(6). Instead,
PNN =
PN(y˙(1− γ)u˙ + 1− y˙)
PN(y˙(1− γ)u˙ + 1− y˙) + (1− PN)(y˙γu˙ + 1− y˙) .
In a symmetric equilibrium with x˙ = y˙ and t˙ = u˙ > 0, we have PNN < 1/2. Nevertheless
we can use the same reasoning as in equation (8) to show that PN|b < PN, and the law of
iterated expectation to show that PB = 1− γ. As a result, hTS(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙) < hS(x˙, t˙). This
implies that, holding x˙ and t˙ constant, sender 1 has less incentive to conceal information
when he faces another sender with the same bias than when he is acting alone. Indeed we
establish a stronger result: hTS(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙) < hTO(x˙, x˙, t˙, t˙), where the superscript TO stands
for “two senders, opposite biases.”
Proposition 7. Given the same beliefs about the investigation level x˙ and the probability of hiding
unfavorable evidence t˙, the benefit from hiding unfavorable evidence is lower when two senders
have the same bias than when they have opposite biases.
To understand Proposition 7, it is easier to think of DM as receiving the two senders’
messages in sequence—first M2 and then M1 (even though the senders choose their mes-
sages simultaneously.) An N message from sender 1, compared to a B message, pulls
DM’s posterior upward. The gap is the value of hiding bad evidence for sender 1. If
sender 2 is of an opposite bias, then DM’s posterior after receiving M2 would be rela-
tively unfavorable to sender 1, so sender 1 has a lot of room to change the DM’s posterior
through concealing bad evidence. But if sender 2 is of the same bias, then DM’s poste-
rior after receiving M2 would be already quite favorable to sender 1, so sender 1 has little
room to further increase DM’s posterior. Therefore, holding x˙ and t˙ constant, sender 1 has
less incentive to hide unfavorable evidence when he faces another sender with the same
bias than when the other sender is of an opposite bias.
However, the same reason that same bias gives a low marginal influence from hiding
evidence also gives a low marginal benefit from investing in evidence. In particular, we
can show that f TS(x˙, θ) < f TO(x˙, θ). Since the level of investigation is determined by the
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condition that the marginal benefit from investigation equals its marginal cost, the next
result follows.
Proposition 8. In a symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium investigation level is strictly lower
when two senders have the same bias than when they have opposite biases.
Proposition 8 shows that the main disadvantage of having two senders with the same
bias is that each sender has less incentive to collect evidence. But because given the same
investigation level, senders with same bias have more incentive to reveal evidence once
it is obtained, no general conclusion can be given regarding the comparison of the equi-
librium t∗ under the case of same bias versus the case of opposite biases. What we have
shown in this section, however, is that the comparison between the single-sender model
and the two-sender model is robust to assumptions about whether the competing senders
have the same bias or opposite biases.
7. Conclusion
This paper studies the interaction between senders’ incentive to investigate for evidence
and their incentive to hide evidence in an attempt to influence the decision maker. Para-
doxically, the possibility of hiding unfavorable evidence provides an incentive for the
sender to invest in obtaining evidence in the first place. When there is a lower exogenous
cost of concealment, a sender invests more in investigation. A lower cost of concealment
may lead to less concealment by the sender because of a feedback effect: a higher inves-
tigation level means that when the sender does not report anything it is more likely that
the sender is hiding something, so the interpretation of silence is more unfavorable to the
sender, reducing his incentive to conceal evidence.
We also find that a sender’s payoff from hiding unfavorable evidence is lower when
there is a competing sender trying to influence the same decision maker, regardless of
whether the other sender has the same or the opposite bias. This is because, when an
sender obtains bad evidence and hides it, he is more pessimistic about the messages sent
by the other sender than is the decision maker, as pooling introduces a divergence in
information sets between himself and the decision maker. Since the payoff from telling
the truth after obtaining unfavorable evidence is not affected by the presence of another
sender, the incentive to hide unfavorable evidence is lower when there is another sender.
On the other hand, when a sender is truly ignorant, he is more optimistic about the
messages sent by the other sender than is the decision maker. As a result, the sender’s
payoff from being ignorant is better when there is another sender. To sum up, when there
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is a competing sender, each sender’s payoff from receiving a favorable evidence does not
change, the payoff from receiving a unfavorable evidence drops, while the payoff from
being ignorant is higher. Together, these imply that the incentive to investigate to obtain
evidence is lower. Furthermore, the feedback effect suggests that a lower investigation
level tends to raise the probability of concealment. As a result, the quality of information,
i.e., the chance that the decision maker receives informative evidence supplied by each
sender, can be lower when two competing senders are trying to influence the same deci-
sion maker. Indeed the deterioration in the quality of information can be so great that it
outweighs the benefit from having two signals instead of one.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose x ∈ (0, x˜1(θ)] and t˙ < 1. Since h is strictly decreasing in x˙
and strictly decreasing in t˙,
h(x˙, t˙) > h(x˙, 1) ≥ h(x˜1(θ), 1) = θ.
This forms a contradiction. Therefore, t˙ = t = 1 if x ∈ (0, x˜1(θ)].
Suppose x ∈ (x˜1(θ), 1). For any x˙, h is strictly decreasing in x˙. Therefore,
h(x˙, 1) < h(x˜1(θ), 1) = θ,
which implies t < 1. Also, h(x˙, 0) = γ − 1/2 > θ, so t > 0. Since t ∈ (0, 1), the
sender must be indifferent between hiding and not hiding, i.e., h(x˙, t˙) = θ, which implies
t˙ = τ(x˙, θ). Because in equilibrium DM’s belief about the sender’s strategy is consistent
with his actual strategy, t = τ(x, θ).
Proof of Proposition 1. We first establish the following claim.
Claim 1. There exists a unique solution of x ∈ (0, 1) to the equation f (x, θ) = C′(x) if
and only if C′(1) > γ− 1/2− θ.
Assume for the moment that the marginal cost function is linear, i.e., C′(x) = αx for
some constant α. Let
g1(x, θ) ≡ 12
2γ− 1
2− x −
1
2
θ,
g2(θ) ≡ γ− 12 − θ.
Note that g2(θ) < g1(x, θ) for x > x˜1(θ), and f (x, θ) = min{g1(x, θ), g2(θ)}. Define αˆ and
xˆ such that C′(x) is tangent to g1(x, θ) if α = αˆ and x = xˆ. Direct calculation shows that
xˆ > x˜1(θ). Note that g1(x, θ)− C′(x) is convex in x, with g1(0, θ)− C′(0) > 0. Therefore
the equation g1(x, θ)− C′(x) = 0 has no solution if α < αˆ, and has two solutions if α > αˆ.
When the equation has two solutions, the two roots x′ and x′′ must satisfy x′ < xˆ < x′′,
and g1(x, θ)− C′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (x′, x′′). Let α′ be such that when α = α′, the smaller
root x′ is equal to x˜1(θ). Note that α′ > αˆ. There are three cases to consider.
(a) If α < αˆ, then g1(x, θ)− C′(x) = 0 has no solution. We have g1(x, θ) > C′(x) for all
x < x˜1(θ).
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(b) If α ∈ [αˆ, α′), then the smaller root to the equation g1(x, θ) − C′(x) = 0 is greater
than x˜1(θ). Again, we have g1(x, θ) > C′(x) for all x < x˜1(θ).
(c) If α ≥ α′, then there is an x′ such that g1(x, θ) > C′(x) for x < x′ and g1(x, θ) < C′(x)
for x ∈ (x′, x˜1(θ)).
In cases (a) and (b), f (x, θ) > C′(x) for x ∈ [0, x˜1(θ)]. Since f (x, θ) is a constant for x ∈
[x˜1(θ), 1], while C′(x) is strictly increasing, by the intermediate value theorem there exists
a unique solution x∗ ∈ (x˜1(θ), 1) to f (x, θ) = C′(x) if and only if C′(1) > f (1, θ) = γ−
1/2− θ. In case (c), x∗ = x′ is the unique solution to f (x, θ) = C′(x) for x ∈ [0, x˜1(θ)] as
x′′ > xˆ > x˜1(θ). Furthermore, since f (x, θ)− C′(x) is strictly decreasing for x ∈ [x˜1(θ), 1]
and is non-positive at x = x˜1(θ), there cannot be another solution to f (x, θ) = C′(x).
Note finally that case (c) applies if and only if C′(x˜1(θ)) ≥ γ − 1/2− θ, which implies
that C′(1) > γ− 1/2− θ. This proves the claim when the marginal cost function is linear.
Next suppose that the marginal cost function is convex (i.e., C′′′ ≥ 0). There are two
cases. First, suppose C′(x˜1(θ)) < g1(x˜1(θ), θ). If we let α = C′(x˜1(θ))/x˜1(θ), then α < α′
defined above. Moreover, the analysis of cases (a) and (b) and the convexity of C′ implies
that g1(x, θ) > αx ≥ C′(x) for x < x˜1(θ). The rest of the analysis is the same. There
can only be one solution x∗ ∈ (x˜1(θ), 1) to be equation f (x, θ) = C′(x). Next, suppose
C′(x˜1(θ)) ≥ g1(x˜1(θ), θ). Then there must exist an x′ ≤ x˜1(θ) such that C′(x′) = g1(x′, θ).
Let α = C′(x′)/x′, then α ≥ α′. The analysis of case (c) and the convexity of C′ implies
that g1(x, θ) > αx ≥ C′(x) for x < x′, and g1(x, θ) < αx ≤ C′(x) for x ∈ (x′, x˜1(θ)).
The rest of the analysis is the same. There is a unique solution x∗ = x′ ∈ (0, x˜1(θ)] to the
equation f (x, θ) = C′(x). This establishes Claim 1.
Case (i). Suppose C′(1) ≤ γ− 1/2− θ. Then x∗ = 1 and t∗ = t(1, θ) = 0 is an equilib-
rium. Since message N does not occur in equilibrium, we can assign the off-equilibrium
belief PN = 1− γ+ θ. Note that this value is equal to limx˙→1 PN(x˙, t(x˙, θ)). We then have
MB(1, 0) = γ − 1/2− θ ≥ C′(1), so the sender has no incentive to lower x∗. Suppose
there exists another interior equilibrium x′ < 1. Such x′ must satisfy f (x′, θ) = C′(x′),
which contradicts Claim 1.
Cases (ii) and (iii). Suppose C′(1) > γ− 1/2− θ. Consider the candidate equilibrium
with x = x˙ = x∗ and t = t˙ = t(x∗, θ), where x∗ satisfies f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗). Recall that
MB(x˙, t˙) depends only on DM’s belief and is constant with respect to the actual choice
of x made by the sender. Therefore, the convexity of C implies that the sender’s payoff
is concave in x. Thus x maximizes his payoff if and only if x = x∗. Claim 1 establishes
that x∗ is unique. Moreover, by Lemma 1, the corresponding equilibrium probability of
concealment is t(x∗, θ).
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Proof of Proposition 2. By Proposition 1, equilibrium x∗ is determined by the condition
that f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗) if x∗ < 1 and f (x∗, θ) ≥ C′(x∗) if x∗ = 1. Note that C′ is increasing,
and the solution is unique. Therefore, to establish that x∗ decreases in θ, it suffices to
show that f (x˙, θ) is strictly decreasing in θ for any fixed x˙.
Pick any θ′ > θ ∈ (0,γ− 1/2), we have x˜1(θ′) < x˜1(θ). Using the functions g1 and
g2 defined in the proof of Proposition 1, since both functions are decreasing in θ, f (x˙, θ)
decreases in θ as well. This proves the first part of the proposition.
Suppose now the quadratic cost function is C(x) = αx2/2. Let I denote the set of θ
for which t∗ < 1 is the equilibrium. Let F denote the set of θ for which t∗ = 1 is the
equilibrium. For a quadratic cost function, if α < 12(γ− 12) then I = [0,γ− 12) and F = ∅;
if α ∈ [12(γ− 12),γ− 12 ], then I = [0, 2(γ− 12 − α)) and F = [2(γ− 12 − α),γ− 12); and if
α > γ− 12 , then I = ∅ and F = [0,γ− 12).
Take any θ ∈ I. Solving the equilibrium condition g2(θ) = C′(x∗) gives x∗ = 1α (γ−
1
2 − θ). Plugging this value of x˙ = x∗ into τ(x˙, θ) gives t∗ = 2θ (α− γ+ 12 + θ). Therefore,
dt∗
dθ
=
2
θ2
(
γ− 1
2
− α
)
,
which is positive because I 6= ∅ implies that α < γ− 12 . Thus, if θ′ > θ and both belong
to I, then t∗(θ′) > t∗(θ). If θ′ ∈ F and θ ∈ I, then t∗(θ′) = 1 > t∗(θ). If θ, θ′ ∈ F, then the
proposition is trivially true because both t∗(θ′) and t∗(θ) are equal to 1.
Finally, given any posterior P upon receiving a message from the sender, the expected
loss of DM is P(1− P)2 + (1− P)P2 = P(1− P). In equilibrium, DM gets message G
with probability x∗/2, message B with probability x∗(1− t∗)/2, and message N with the
remaining probability. Therefore, her equilibrium loss is
L∗ = 1
2
x∗PG(1− PG) + 12 x
∗(1− t∗)PB(1− PB) +
(
1− x∗ + 1
2
x∗t∗
)
PN(1− PN)
=
(
x∗ − 1
2
x∗t∗
)
γ(1− γ) + 1
2
(1− x∗ + x∗(1− γ)t∗)(1− x∗ + x∗γt∗)
2(1− x∗) + x∗t∗
Taking derivative with respect to x∗ and t∗, for x∗ ∈ (0, 1) and t∗ ∈ (0, 1), we have
∂L∗
∂x∗
= − (2γ− 1)
2 (2(1− x∗)2(1− t∗) + t∗ + (t∗x∗)2)
2(2(1− x∗) + x∗t∗)2 < 0,
∂L∗
∂t∗
=
(2γ− 1)2x∗(1− x∗)
2(2(1− x∗) + x∗t∗)2 > 0.
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Since an increase in θ lowers x∗ and raises t∗ (given a quadratic cost function), it raises
the equilibrium loss to DM.
Proof for Lemma 2. If h(x˙, y˙, 1, u˙)− θ > 0, then sender 1 strictly prefers hiding bad evi-
dence to revealing it. So t = 1 is a best response. Further, since h is strictly decreasing in t˙,
t = 1 is the unique best response. Similarly, if h(x˙, y˙, 0, u˙)− θ < 0, then t = 0 is the unique
best response. When neither of these two conditions hold, there is a unique t˙ ∈ [0, 1] that
solves h(x˙, y˙, t˙, u˙) − θ = 0. At such a t˙, sender 1 is indifferent between concealing and
revealing evidence. So choosing t = t˙ is a unique best response. That is, tBR(t˙, x˙, y˙, θ) is
the best response function for sender 1. Similar reasoning shows that uBR(t˙, x˙, y˙, θ) is the
best response function for sender 2. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with investigation
levels x and y, t = t˙ and u = u˙ must satisfy the fixed point property that t = tBR(u, x, y, θ)
and u = uBR(t, x, y, θ).
Proof of Lemma 3. In a symmetric equilibrium, x = y = x˙ = y˙ and t = u = t˙ = u˙.
Therefore,
h(x, x, t, t) = x(γ2 + (1− γ)2)(PNB − PBB) + 2γ(1− γ)x(1− t)(PNG − PBG)
+ (1− x + 2γ(1− γ)xt)(PNN − PBN).
By symmetry, PNN = PBG = 1/2 and PBN = 1− PNG. Thus h(x, x, t, t) simplifies to
x(γ2 + (1− γ)2)
(
PNB − (1− γ)
2
γ2 + (1− γ)2
)
+ (1− x + 2γ(1− γ)x)
(
PNG − 12
)
,
where
PNB =
(1− γ)(1− x + (1− γ)tx)
1− x + (γ2 + (1− γ)2)tx ,
PNG =
γ(1− x + (1− γ)tx)
1− x + 2γ(1− γ)tx .
It can be verified that both PNB and PNG are decreasing in t. Hence h(x, x, t, t) is decreasing
in t. Moreover, the derivative of h(x, x, t, t) with respect to x is
(γ2 + (1− γ)2)
(
PNB − (1− γ)
2
γ2 + (1− γ)2 − PNG +
1
2
)
+ x(γ2 + (1− γ)2)∂PNB
∂x
+ (1− x + 2γ(1− γ)x)∂PNG
∂x
.
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It can be verified that each of these three terms are negative. Hence h(x, x, t, t) is decreas-
ing in x. It follows immediately that x˜0(θ) > x˜1(θ).
Suppose x ∈ (0, x˜1(θ)], which implies that h(x, x, 1, 1) ≥ θ. If t < 1, the benefit
of hiding bad evidence is h(x, x, t, t) > h(x, x, 1, 1) ≥ θ, so each sender would want to
choose t = 1, which is a contradiction. Therefore, t = 1.
Suppose x ∈ (x˜1(θ), x˜0(θ)), which implies that h(x, x, 1, 1) < θ and h(x, x, 0, 0) > θ.
If t = 1, then the benefit of hiding bad evidence is h(x, x, t, t) = h(x, x, 1, 1) < θ, which
is a contradiction. If t = 0, then h(x, x, t, t) = h(x, x, 0, 0) > θ, again a contradiction.
Therefore we must have t ∈ (0, 1). Since sender 1 must be indifferent between sending
message N and sending message B when t ∈ (0, 1), the only value of t that is consistent
with indifference must satisfy h(x, x, t, t) = θ, which implies t = t(x, θ).
Suppose x ≥ x˜0(θ), which implies that h(x, x, 0, 0) ≤ θ. If t > 0, then h(x, x, t, t) <
h(x, x, 0, 0) ≤ θ, so each sender would want to choose t = 0, which gives a contradiction.
Therefore, t = 0.
Finally, t(x, θ) is continuous and decreasing in x because h(x, x, t, t) is continuous and
decreasing in both x and t. For the limit value of t(x, θ), there are two cases to consider.
Case (i). If x˜0(θ) < 1, then for x ∈ [x˜0(θ), 1), t(x, θ) = 0, so limx→1 t(x, θ) = 0. Case
(ii). If x˜0(θ) ≥ 1, then for x ∈ [x˜1(θ), 1), t(x, θ) = τ(x, θ). Take any e > 0. One can
find xe such that h(xe, xe, e, e) = θ. This is because h(1, 1, e, e) = 0 < θ and h(0, 0, e, e) =
γ− 12 > θ. Since h(1, 1, e, e) = 0 and h(xe, xe, e, e) = θ, for any x ∈ (xe, 1), it must be that
0 < h(x, x, e, e) < θ. By definition, h(x, x, τ(x, θ), τ(x, θ)) = θ. This implies τ(x, θ) < e.
That is, for any e > 0, there exists xe such that for all x ∈ (xe, 1), τ(x, θ) < e. Therefore,
limx→1 τ(x, θ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first establish some properties of the f function.
Claim 2. f (x, θ) is strictly increasing in x for x ∈ (0, x˜1(θ)), strictly decreasing in x for
x ∈ (x˜1(θ), min{x˜0(θ), 1}), and equal to 0 for x ≥ x˜0(θ).
For x ≤ x˜1(θ), t(x, θ) = 1. Therefore,
Ub(x, x, t(θ, x), t(x, θ)) = PN|b − θ = (γ2 + (1− γ)2)xPNB + (1− (γ2 + (1− γ)2)x)
1
2
− θ,
Un(x, x, t(θ, x), t(x, θ)) = PN|n =
1
2
xPNB + (1− 12 x)
1
2
;
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where
PNB =
(1− γ)(1− γx)
1− 2γ(1− γ)x .
Since f (x, θ) = (Ug +Ub)/2−Un, we obtain:
f (x, θ) =
2γ− 1
4(1− 2γ(1− γ)x) −
1
2
θ,
which is increasing in x.
For x ∈ (x˜1(θ), min{x˜0(θ), 1}), t(x, θ) = τ(x, θ) ∈ (0, 1). Using the fact that PN|n =
(PN|g + PN|b)/2, we obtain:
f (x, θ) =
1
2
(γ− PN|g) +
1
2
(PB|b − PN|b) =
1
2
(γ− PN|g)−
1
2
θ.
Therefore, we just need to prove that PN|g is increasing in x given that t = τ (for which
we drop the arguments to save on notation). Note that
PN|g = [xPNB + (1− x)PNN ] + (1− 2γ(1− γ))x[(1− τ)PNG + τPNN − PNB],
PN|b = [xPNB + (1− x)PNN ] + 2γ(1− γ)x[(1− τ)PNG + τPNN − PNB].
Therefore,
PN|g =
1− 2γ(1− γ)
2γ(1− γ) PN|b −
1− 4γ(1− γ)
2γ(1− γ) [xPNB + (1− x)PNN ].
Since PN|b is fixed at 1− γ+ θ when t = τ, and since 1− 4γ(1− γ) > 0, PN|g is increasing
in x if and only if xPNB + (1− x)PNN is decreasing in x.
Suppose to the contrary that xPNB + (1− x)PNN is increasing in x. Then, since PNN =
1/2, we have
x
dPNB
dx
+ (PNB − PNN) ≥ 0,
which implies that dPNB/dx > 0 because PNB − PNN < 0. From equations (5) and (7), we
see that both PNG and PNB depend on x through PN, and that both are increasing in PN.
So, if dPNB/dx > 0, we must have dPNG/dx > 0. Since PN|b is fixed at 1− γ+ θ when
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t = τ, its derivative with respect to x is equal to zero. This condition gives:
x
dPNB
dx
+ (PNB − PNN) = 2γ(1− γ)
[
x
dPNB
dx
− x(1− τ)dPNG
dx
−x(PNN − PNG)∂τ∂x − [(1− τ)PNG + τPNN − PNB]
]
≥ 0.
Since 2γ(1− γ) < 1, this equation implies
x(1− τ)dPNG
dx
+ x(PNN − PNG)∂τ∂x+ ≤ −(1− τ)[PNG − PNN].
This is a contradiction because each of the two terms on the left-hand-side is positive,
while the right-hand-side is negative. We conclude that xPNB + (1 − x)PNN must be
strictly decreasing in x, which implies that f (x, θ) is strictly decreasing in x in this in-
terval.
Finally, for x ≥ x˜0(θ), t(x, θ) = 0. Therefore, PN|n = 1/2 and f (x, θ) = 0. This proves
Claim 2.
Claim 3. There exists a unique solution of x ∈ (0, 1) to the equation f (x, θ) = C′(x) if
and only if C′(1) > f (θ).
Assume for the moment that the marginal cost function is linear, i.e., C′(x) = αx for
some constant α. Let
g1(x, θ) ≡ 2γ− 14(1− 2γ(1− γ)x) −
1
2
θ.
Note that g1(x, θ) = f (x, θ) for x ≤ x˜1(θ), and g1(x, θ) > f (x, θ) for x > x˜1(θ). Define αˆ
and xˆ such that C′(x) is tangent to g1(x, θ) if α = αˆ and x = xˆ. Direct calculation shows
that
xˆ =
1
4γ(1− γ) > 1 > x˜1(θ).
Note that g1(x, θ)−C′(x) is convex in x, with g1(0, θ)−C′(0) > 0. Therefore the equation
g1(x, θ) − C′(x) = 0 has no solution if α < αˆ, or has two solutions if α > αˆ. When
the equation has two solutions, the two roots x′ and x′′ must satisfy x′ < xˆ < x′′, and
g1(x, θ)− C′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (x′, x′′). Let α′ be such that when α = α′, the smaller root
x′ is equal to x˜1(θ). Note that α′ > αˆ. There are two cases to consider.
(a) If αˆ ≤ α < α′, then the smaller root to the equation g1(x, θ)− C′(x) = 0 is greater
than x˜1(θ). We have g1(x, θ) > C′(x) for all x < x˜1(θ).
(b) If α ≥ α′, then there is an x′ such that g1(x, θ) > C′(x) for x < x′ and g1(x, θ) < C′(x)
for x ∈ (x′, x˜1(θ)).
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In cases (a), f (x, θ) > C′(x) for x ∈ [0, x˜1(θ)]. Claim 2 establishes that f (x, θ) is decreasing
for x ∈ [x˜1(θ), 1], while C′(x) is strictly increasing. By the intermediate value theorem
there exists a unique solution x∗ ∈ (x˜1(θ), 1) to f (x, θ) = C′(x) if and only if C′(1) >
f (θ). In case (b), x∗ = x′ is the unique solution to f (x, θ) = C′(x) for x ∈ [0, x˜1(θ)].
Furthermore, since f (x, θ) − C′(x) is strictly decreasing for x ∈ [x˜1(θ), 1] and is non-
positive at x = x˜1(θ), there cannot be another solution to f (x, θ) = C′(x). Note finally
that case (b) applies if and only if C′(x˜1(θ)) ≥ f (θ), which implies that C′(1) > f (θ). This
proves the claim when the marginal cost function is linear.
Next suppose that the marginal cost function is convex (i.e., C′′′ ≥ 0). There are two
cases. First, suppose C′(x˜1(θ)) < f (θ). If we let α = C′(x˜1(θ))/x˜1(θ), then α < α′.
Moreover, the analysis of case (a) and the convexity of C′ implies that g1(x, θ) > αx ≥
C′(x) for x < x˜1(θ). The rest of the analysis is the same. Next, suppose C′(x˜1(θ)) ≥
g1(x˜1(θ), θ). Then there must exist an x′ ≤ x˜1(θ) such that C′(x′) = g1(x′, θ). Let α =
C′(x′)/x′, then α ≥ α′. The analysis of case (b) and the convexity of C′ implies that
g1(x, θ) > αx ≥ C′(x) for x < x′, and g1(x, θ) < αx ≤ C′(x) for x ∈ (x′, x˜1(θ)). The rest
of the analysis is the same. This establishes Claim 3.
We are now in the position to prove the proposition.
Case (i). Suppose C′(1) ≤ f (θ). Then x∗ = 1 and t∗ = t(1, θ) = 0 is an equilibrium.
Since message N does not occur in equilibrium, we can assign the off-equilibrium beliefs:
PM1 M2 = limx˙→1 PM1 M2(x˙, t(x˙, θ)) for any M1 = N or M2 = N. Note that this implies
MB(1, 1, 0, 0) = f (θ) ≥ C′(1), so the sender has no incentive to lower x∗. Suppose there
exists another interior equilibrium x′ < 1. Such x′ must satisfy f (x′, θ) = C′(x′), which
contradicts Claim 3.
Cases (ii) and (iii). Suppose C′(1) > f (θ). Consider the candidate equilibrium with
x = x˙ = x∗ and t = t˙ = t(x∗, θ), where x∗ satisfies f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗). Recall that MB(x˙, t˙)
depends only on DM’s belief and is constant with respect to the actual choice of x made
by the sender. Therefore, the convexity of C implies that the sender’s payoff is concave in
x. Thus x maximizes his payoff if and only if x = x∗. Claim 3 establishes that x∗ is unique.
Moreover, by Lemma 3, the corresponding equilibrium hiding probability is t(x∗, θ).
Proof for Proposition 4. When x < x˜1(θ),
f (θ, x) =
2γ− 1
4(1− 2γ(1− γ)x) −
1
2
θ,
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which is strictly decreasing in θ. When x ∈ [x˜1(θ), min{x˜0(θ), 1}],
f (θ, x) =
1
2
(γ− PN|g)−
1
2
θ.
We observe that PN|g is decreasing in t(x, θ). By Lemma 2, t(θ, x) is decreasing in θ.
So PN|g is increasing in θ, which implies that f (x, θ) is strictly decreasing in θ. Since
an increase in θ shifts down the marginal benefit curve f (·, θ), and since x∗ satisfies
f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗) if x∗ < 1 and limx→1 f (x, θ) > C′(1) if x∗ = 1, we conclude that an
increase in θ lowers the equilibrium x∗.
Proof of Proposition 5. We claim that x˜T1 (θ) < x˜
S
1 (θ). Suppose not, i.e., x˜
T
1 (θ) ≥ x˜S1 (θ).
Then we have
θ = hT(x˜T1 (θ), x˜
T
1 (θ), 1, 1) ≤ hT(x˜S1 (θ), x˜S1 (θ), 1, 1) < hS(x˜S1 (θ), 1) = θ,
a contradiction. Therefore, x˜T1 (θ) < x˜
S
1 (θ).
Case (i). x˙ ≤ x˜T1 (θ). The senders are believed to hide unfavorable evidence with
probability one in both models. Since PN|b < PN and PN|n > PN, we have
f T(x˙, θ) =
1
2
γ+
1
2
(PN|b − θ)− PN|n <
1
2
γ+
1
2
(PN − θ)− PN = f S(x˙, θ).
Case (ii). x˙ ∈ (x˜T1 (θ), x˜S1 (θ)]. The senders are believed to randomize under the two-
sender model, but a single sender is believed to hide unfavorable evidence with proba-
bility one. Since f T(·, θ) is decreasing while f S(·, θ) is increasing in this interval, we have
f T(x˙, θ) < f T(x˜T1 (θ), θ) < f
S(x˜T1 (θ), θ) < f
S(x˙, θ).
Case (iii). x˙ ∈ (x˜S1 (θ), min{x˜T0 (θ), 1}). The senders are believed to randomize in both
models. Since PN|n > PN, we have
f T(x˙, θ) =
1
2
γ+
1
2
(1− γ)− PN|n <
1
2
γ+
1
2
(1− γ)− PN = f S(x˙, θ).
Case (iv). x˙ ≥ x˜T0 (θ) (with x˜T0 (θ) < 1). The senders are believed to always reveal un-
favorable evidence in the two-sender model, but a single sender is believed to randomize
between revealing and concealing evidence. In this case, f T(x˙, θ) = 0 < f S(x˙, θ).
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Finally, x˙ = 1 in the two-sender model if
C′(1) ≤ f (θ) = lim
x˙→1
f T(x˙, θ) < lim
x˙→1
f S(x˙, θ) = γ− 1
2
− θ.
Therefore, whenever x∗ = x˙ = 1 in the two-sender case, we have x∗ = x˙ = 1 in the
single-sender case as well.
Proof for Proposition 6. Denote the loss of the DM under the single-sender model by
LS(xS, tS,γ) and that under the two-sender model by LT(xT, tT,γ). Let LS∗ and LT∗ de-
note the equilibrium loss of DM in these two models. Then, LS(1, 0, 1)− LT(1, 0, 1) = 0.
By the loss function’s continuity in γ, for any e > 0, there exists a cutoff γˆ(e) such that for
any γ ∈ (γˆ(e), 1), e > LS(1, 0,γ)− LT(1, 0,γ) > 0. Also, Li(xi, ti,γ) is strictly decreasing
in xi for any ti ∈ [0, 1] and any γ ∈ [0, 1] for i = T, S.
Given that C′(1) < 1/2− θ, we have C′(1) < γ− 1/2− θ for γ sufficiently close to
1. For such values of γ, xS = 1 and tS = 0 in the single-sender model. Therefore the
equilibrium loss for DM is LS∗ = LS(1, 0,γ).
In the two-sender model, the condition that x˜0(θ) satisfies h(x˜0(θ), x˜0(θ), 0, 0) = θ
gives
x˜0(θ) =
2γ− 1− 2θ
(2γ− 1)3 .
Since x˜0(θ) = 1− 2θ when γ = 1, we have x˜0(θ) < 1 for γ sufficiently close to 1, which im-
plies that C′(1) > f (θ) = 0 for such γ. Since C′(x) is strictly positive, we have xT < 1 and
tT > 0 in the symmetric equilibrium of the two-sender model. Let e = LT∗ − LT(1, 0,γ),
which is strictly positive by the strict monotonicity of the loss function. Then for any
γ > max{γˆ(e), C′(1) + θ + 1/2}, we have LT∗ − LS∗ = LT(1, 0,γ) + e − LS(1, 0,γ) >
−e+ e = 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Direct calculation shows that hTS(x, x, t, t)− hTO(x, x, t, t) is equal
to
−(2γ− 1)5t2(1− x)2x2
2(1− x + 2γ(1− γ)tx)(1− x + (γ2 + (1− γ)2)tx)
× (1− x + tx)
(2− 4x + 2tx + 2x2 − 2tx2 + t2x2 − 2γt2x2 + 2γ2t2x2) ,
which is negative.
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Proof of Proposition 8. We first establish the following claims.
Claim 4. Let x˜TS1 (θ) be the value of x˙ that solves h
TS(x˙, x˙, 1, 1) = θ. Let x˜TS0 (θ) be the
value of x˙ that satisfies h(x˙, x˙, 0, 0) = θ. Let x˜TO1 (θ) and x˜
TO
0 (θ) represent the counterparts
in the two-sender model with opposite biases. Then x˜TS1 (θ) < x˜
TO
1 (θ) and x˜
TS
0 (θ) =
x˜TO0 (θ).
Suppose to the contrary that x˜TS1 (θ) ≥ x˜TO1 (θ). Then, by Proposition 7 and by the fact
that hTO(x˙, x˙, 1, 1) is decreasing in x˙, we have
θ = hTS(x˜TS1 (θ), x˜
TS
1 (θ), 1, 1) < h
TO(x˜TS1 (θ), x˜
TS
1 (θ), 1, 1) < h
TO(x˜TO1 (θ), x˜
TO
1 (θ), 1, 1) = θ.
which is a contradiction. Therefore, x˜TS1 (θ) < x˜
TO
1 (θ).
Furthermore, from the proof of Proposition 7, we see that hTS(x˙, x˙, 0, 0)− hTO(x˙, x˙, 0, 0) =
0. Thus, x˜TS0 (θ) = x˜
TO
0 (θ). This establishes Claim 4.
Claim 5. f TS(x, θ) is strictly decreasing in x for x ∈ (x˜TS1 (θ), min{x˜TS0 (θ), 1}).
For ease of notation, we will drop the superscript TS in establishing this claim. For
x ∈ (x˜1(θ), min{x˜0(θ), 1}), t(x, θ) = τ(x, θ) ∈ (0, 1). As in the proof of Claim 3, we have
f (x, θ) =
1
2
(γ− PN|g)−
1
2
θ.
Therefore, to show that f (x, θ) is decreasing in x, we just need to prove that PN|g is in-
creasing in x given that t = τ. Note that
PN|g = [xPNG + (1− x)PNN] + 2γ(1− γ)x[(1− τ)PNB + τPNN − PNG],
PN|b = [xPNG + (1− x)PNN] + (1− 2γ(1− γ))x[(1− τ)PNB + τPNN − PNG].
Therefore,
PN|g =
2γ(1− γ)
1− 2γ(1− γ)PN|b +
1− 4γ(1− γ)
1− 2γ(1− γ) [xPNG + (1− x)PNN].
Since PN|b is fixed at 1− γ+ θ when t = τ, and since 1− 4γ(1− γ) > 0, PN|g is increasing
in x if and only if xPNG + (1− x)PNN is increasing in x.
Suppose to the contrary that xPNG + (1− x)PNN is decreasing in x. Since PN|b is fixed
at 1− γ+ θ when t = τ, its derivative with respect to x is equal to zero. This condition
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gives:
x
dPNG
dx
+ (1− x)dPNN
dx
+ (PNG − PNN)
= (1− 2γ(1− γ))
[
x
dPNG
dx
− xτdPNN
dx
− x(1− τ)dPNB
dx
−x(PNN − PNB)∂τ
∂x
+ [PNG − τPNN − (1− τ)PNB]
]
.
Note that (a) ∂τ/∂x < 0; (b) both PNN and PNB are decreasing in x; (c) both sides are
negative; and (d) 1− 2γ(1− γ) < 1. Therefore the above equation implies
(1− x + xτ)dPNN
dx
+ x(1− τ)dPNB
dx
+ x(PNN − PNB)∂τ
∂x
≥ (1− τ)(PNN − PNB).
There are two cases to consider. Case (i). dPNG/dx ≤ 0. In this case, the left-hand-side is
negative because dPNB/dx and dPNG/dx have the same sign, while the right-hand-side
is positive—a contradiction. Case (ii). dPNG/dx > 0. In this case, we can rearrange the
inequality to get
x(1− τ)dPNB
dx
+ (1− x)dPNN
dx
+ (PNG − PNN)
≥ −xτdPNN
dx
− x(PNN − PNB)∂τ
∂x
+ [PNG − τPNN − (1− τ)PNB].
The right-hand-side of the above is positive. The left-hand-side is less than the derivative
of xPNG + (1− x)PNN because 0 < dPNB/dx < dPNG/dx. But since by assumption the
derivative of xPNG + (1− x)PNN is negative, we have a contradiction. We conclude that
xPNG + (1− x)PNN must be increasing in x, which implies that f (x, θ) is decreasing in x
in this interval. This proves Claim 5.
We are now in the position to prove the proposition.
Case (i). Suppose x˙ ≤ x˜TS1 (θ). Then the senders are believed to hide unfavorable
evidence with probability one under both the case of same bias and of opposite biases.
Direct calculation shows that f TS(x˙, θ)− f TO(x˙, θ) is equal to
−(2γ− 1)5(1− x˙)2x˙2
4(1− 2γ(1− γ)x˙)(1− x˙ + 2γ(1− γ)x˙)(2(1− x˙) + x˙2(γ2 + (1− γ)2)x˙2) ,
which is negative.
Case (ii). Suppose x˙ ∈ (x˜TS1 (θ), x˜TO1 (θ)]. Then the senders are believed to randomize
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between revealing and concealing evidence in the case of same bias, but they conceal
evidence with probability one in the case of opposite biases. By Claim 2 in the proof of
Proposition 3, f TO(x˙, θ) is increasing in x˙ in this interval; and by Claim 5, f TS(x˙, θ) is
decreasing in x˙ in this interval. Therefore,
f TS(x˙, θ) < f TS(x˜TS1 (θ), θ) < f
TO(x˜TS1 (θ), θ) < f
TO(x˙, θ).
Case (iii). x˙ ∈ (x˜TO1 (θ), min{x˜TS0 (θ), 1}). Then the senders are believed to randomize
in both models. Let tTS denote the probability of concealing evidence under the same bias
model, and let tTO denote the corresponding probability under the opposite biases model
given the same belief x˙. By Proposition 7, we have tTS < tTO. Let UTSN|n(x˙, t˙) denote the
expected payoff of sender 1 when he receives no evidence in the symmetric equilibrium
of the same bias model with belief x˙ and t˙. Define UTON|n(t) similarly for the opposite biases
model:
UTON|n(x˙, t˙) =
1
2
x˙PNB +
1
2
x˙(1− t˙)PNG + (12 x˙t˙ + 1− x˙)
1
2
.
Note that UTON|n(x˙, t˙) is decreasing in t˙ because the posteriors PNB and PNG are both de-
creasing in t˙, and higher t˙ moves more weight from 1/2 to PNG > 1/2. Now,
UTSN|n(x˙, t˙)−UTON|n(x˙, t˙) =
1
2
x˙t˙(PNG − PNB)− (12 x˙t˙ + 1− x˙)(
1
2
− PTSNN).
A direct calculation shows that this is equal to
(2γ− 1)5 t˙3(1− x˙)x˙3(1− x˙ + x˙t˙)
4(1− x˙ + 2γ(1− γ)x˙t˙)(1− x˙ + (γ2 + (1− γ)2)x˙t˙)(((1− γ)x˙t˙ + 1− x˙)2 + (γx˙t˙ + 1− x˙)2) ,
which is positive. Thus,
UTSN|n(x˙, t
TS) > UTON|n(x˙, t
TS) > UTON|n(x˙, t
TO),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that UTON|n(x˙, t˙) is decreasing in t˙. Since
f (x˙, θ) = 1/2−UN|n for both the same bias model and the same bias model and opposite
biases model in this interval, we have f TS(x˙, θ) < f TO(x˙, θ).
Case (iv). x˙ ≥ x˜TS0 (θ) (when x˜TS0 (θ) < 1). Then the senders are believed to hide with
zero probability in both cases. We have f TS(x˙, θ) = f TO(x˙, θ) = 0.
We have shown that f TS(x˙, θ) < f TO(x˙, θ) for x˙ < x˜TS0 (θ). Since equilibrium investi-
gation x∗ is given by the condition that f (x∗, θ) = C′(x∗) if x∗ < 1, limx˙→1(x˙, θ) ≥ C′(1)
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if x∗ = 1, and x∗ < min{x˜TS0 (θ), 1} = min{x˜TO0 (θ), 1}, we conclude that the equilibrium
investigation levels in these two models satisfy xTS < xTO.
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